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6Assessing the Candidates: 
‘If the majority does not vote, the minority will govern’
On Parkway Square in north Tehran is a large banner sponsored by a political party not supporting Ahmadinejad. It reads, ‘If the majority does not vote, the minority will govern.’ This sentence is part of the Islamic Republic’s campaign to obtain high voter turnout. It also has a subtle meaning aimed at the youth and urban populations which 
constitute an electoral majority and thus underscores a dynamic of the 2009 presidential elections, 
considered by many to be the most important election since 1989. A large voter turnout amongst 
these groups will bring defeat to the current president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and ensure victory 
of one of the reformist-leaning candidates, Mehdi Karrubi or Mir Hossein Mussavi. 
POLITICAL BACKDROP
In the post-Khomeini era elite infighting became a key characteristic of political life. In the period 
1989-1992, the recently elected president, Rafsanjani, joined forces with the right to  fatally weaken 
the political power of the leftists who had dominated the Parliament since the early 1980s. The 
conservative Guardians Council, with the support of Rafsanjani, used its constitutional power to vet 
potential candidates for national elections to prevent most leftists from running in the 1992 parlia-
mentary elections. Conservatives thus dominated the Fourth Majles (1992-1996). 
This broad rightist-conservative coalition cracked as conservatives opposed Rafsanjani’s consolida-
tion of power and economic and social policies. The infighting produced two groups, termed here as 
the traditional right and the modern right. The modern right and its eventual political party, Serv-
ants of Reconstruction, support the economic and industrialisation policies initiated by Rafsanjani 
and change in the political and social spheres.  The traditional right, controlling the major levers of 
power, succeeded in paralysing the second Rafsanjani administration (1993-1997) and obtained an 
absolute majority in the Fifth Majles (1996-2000). 
The sense that the traditional right was close to obtaining control of all major political institutions 
reached a peak as the 1997 presidential elections approached. This led to a political alliance between 
the modern right and those on the left and created momentum for a Khatami presidency. Khatami 
won two presidential elections with previously unseen majorities. His emphasis on civil society, politi-
cal reform, and rule of law served to unite the traditional right which felt a threat to its power. At 
the same time, the Khatami presidency contributed greatly to the momentum behind the emergence 
of another group, the new right, from which Ahmadinejad comes. On the one hand, this group be-
lieves in the achievement of social justice through leftist economic policies. On the other hand, this 
group does not believe in Khatami’s political reformism and calls for a return to Islamic cultural and 
moral purity as defined by it. The new right and the traditional right formed a broad coalition, called 
the United Principalist Front, to combat the reformism of Khatami. This group won the 2004 parlia-
mentary elections and ended reformist control of that body. 
Zhand Shakibi is Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the LSE and Visiting 
Professor at University of Tehran. He is the author of Revolutions and 
the Collapse of Monarchy: Human Agency and the Making of Revolution 
in France, Russia, and Iran (2007) and Khatami and Gorbachev: Politics of 
Change in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the USSR (2009). 
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The results of the two rounds of the 2005 presidential elections say much about Ahmadinejad’s 
chances in 2009. In the first round of these elections 58% of the population voted for one of the 
reformist and/or moderate candidates. Ahmadinejad, whilst coming in second, obtained just 19.5%. 
In this round, Ahmadinejad’s slogans of social justice, sharing of the national oil wealth amongst the 
lower and lower-middle classes, and war on corruption, proved effective. However, the mistakes of 
the reformist camp were more important. Unable to co-ordinate strategy, the reformists ended up 
putting up two rival candidates, Mehdi Karrubi and Mostafa Moin, Khatami’s education secretary. 
Sensing that these two candidates were not electorally viable, the former president, Rafsanjani, 
decided to run. These three candidates split the majority moderate and reformist vote in the country 
which gave enough room for Ahmadinejad to come in second. Since no candidate obtained 50% of 
the vote, the elections went to a second round.
Ahmadinejad’s victory in the second round was due to two basic factors. First, Ahmadinejad success-
fully portrayed himself as a fresh political figure with a folksy touch who understood the economic 
pain of the lower-middle and lower classes and would fight against corruption. With no seeming link 
to the economic policies of the previous sixteen years that had created discontent and with populist 
promises to spread the country’s oil wealth he portrayed himself as anti-establishment. Second, his 
rival in this round, Rafsanjani, symbolised the establishment and corruption for many people. Many 
who had voted for a reformist candidate in the first round voted for Ahmadinejad in the second or 
simply did not vote. He obtained 62% of the vote with a low turn-out of 59%.
2009-THE CANDIDATES
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s position in 2009 is significantly different 
from that of 2005. First, he is now a national political figure with 
a record on which the electorate can judge him. He is now seen by 
many as the establishment candidate. Second, his economic, social, 
and foreign policies have created discontent amongst various social 
and elite groups. He has failed to implement his populist slogans and 
has presided over an economic decline that has seen most people’s 
living standards drop as inflation and unemployment have  risen. 
Third, the broad conservative coalition, the United Principalist Front, 
that supported him in 2005 has fragmented as a result of his econom-
ic and foreign policies into pro and anti Ahmadinejad camps. At the 
same time, the reformist coalition, although fielding two candidates, 
is more unified and organised than four years ago. 
Ahmadinejad does hold several strong cards. First, the government-controlled mass media provides 
him with plenty of positive coverage whilst giving little air time to  the other candidates . Having 
said that, it is debatable how effective positive mass media coverage can be for Ahmadinejad given 
the poor economic situation and discontent on street level. Second, his supporters are more likely to 
come out and vote and be active in the campaign than those of his reformist rivals. Third, govern-
ment and semi-governmental organisations with a country-wide infrastructure aide in the mobilisa-
tion of the vote for Ahmadinejad. 
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Guards, is running as the alternative conservative candidate. 
Over the past two years he has become a severe critic of the 
economic and foreign policies of Ahmadinejad. Announcing his 
candidacy Rezai stressed, ‘‘If the current approach is continued, 
we will find ourselves at the edge of a cliff.’ Whilst he has no 
real chance of defeating Ahmadinejad, he may take one million 
or so votes from Ahmadinejad in the first round and thus make 
a first-round victory for him very difficult. Moreover, Rezai’s 
hammering away from the right at Ahmadinejad’s record 
weakens the president. 
Mehdi Karrubi has served in some political capacity since the founding of the IRI, including two 
terms as speaker of the parliament. Being the first of the candidates to announce his candidacy, he 
is backed by a political party, National Confidence, which he founded, a popular newspaper, and a 
campaign structure in many parts of the country. He is known as a straight-talker who gives sharp 
and direct answers to attacks on him by Ahmadinejad’s supporters. His increasingly combative style 
with this group and  radical rhetoric are gradually improving his electoral chances. 
His platform to a significant degree reflects that of Khatami. He has called for economic reform to 
undo the damage of the last four years, breaking the government monopoly on the mass media, 
greater freedom of speech and press, creating the conditions for the development of political parties 
and political reform, the abolition of Ahmadinejad’s moral police, 
and breaking Iran’s international isolation. He has attracted to his 
camp many leading reformists and modern rightists.  
Karrubi has two main weaknesses. First, at 72 years old, people see 
in him a one-term president as they doubt he would be willing or 
able to run for a second term in four years. Second, he comes across 
to many as a politician who wants and admires power. In Iranian 
political culture a candidate with such an image will find obtaining 
the urban vote rather difficult. He has been working on this image 
problem with some success, and from the middle of May appeared to 
be  gaining in popularity. 
Hossein Mussavi, prime minister until the post was abolished by the 
1989 constitutional changes, re-entered political life after twenty years because, as he stresses, ‘In 
the past twenty years I have not seen such danger as the one I have seen in the last four years.’ The 
announcement of his candidacy created a political sensation and scandal since it led to Khatami’s 
withdrawal from the race. Mussavi is considered the favourite to beat Ahmadinejad in a second 
round. He has significant support in the establishment, including in the Revolutionary Guards. He 
does not arouse fears and anxiety amongst the major elite groups and institutions which therefore 
do not consider a Mussavi presidency a threat. These groups were sensitive about another Khatami 
presidency. Unlike Karrubi, he will be able to attract the votes of disaffected conservatives and those 
of moderates and reformists . Organisations such as Servants of Reconstruction (modern right), Mo-
jahedin of the Islamic Revolution (leftist group), and the Association of Militant Clergy, a key clerical 
organisation, have announced their support for him. Unlike Karrubi, he enjoys a positive image 
amongst those who remember him. He does not come across as someone thirsting for power while 
instead appearing cultured and hard-working. He calls himself a reformist. Khatami himself has 
9thrown his support behind him, and many of his campaign posters 
have a picture of him next to one of Khatami. To gain the youth vote 
he needs to be seen as the successor of Khatami and his programme. 
Whilst he has spoken in general terms about the need for freedom of 
press and the mass media, and political and economic reform, he has 
yet to produce a manifesto.  
Despite his reformist political colouring, Mussavi faces some serious 
challenges which worry many about his chances of defeating Ah-
madinejad. He is rather uncharismatic and is a poor public speaker. 
Importantly, those under the age of 35, who make up a majority of 
the population, do not really know him. Both reformist challengers 
need this group’s support to defeat Ahmadinejad. In order to get his 
message out and introduce himself to the electorate, Mussavi needs 
mass media, which is in the hands of Ahmadinejad. Morever, he  is still establishing an effective 
country-wide campaign structure. Only in the week of 18 May did he start publishing a newspaper. 
PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
The key to a reformist victory is a large voter turn-out amongst the youth and urban population, 
including first-time and occasional voters, amongst whom Ahmadinejad enjoys  little popularity. The 
challenge for Karrubi and Moussavi is to convince these groups that Ahmadinejad can be defeated 
and get them to the ballot box. Both men are tailoring policies to these groups. For example, both 
have promised to abolish the moral police set up by Ahmadinejad to enforce Islamic dress code on 
men and women. What probably will be most effective in bringing this vote out is discontent with 
Ahmadinejad. In the first round of the 2005 elections reformist and moderate candidates captured 
70% of the urban and youth vote compared to Ahmadinejad’s 21%. Even Ahmadinejad’s showing in 
rural and small urban  areas was not very impressive. For example, in large voting districts having a 
rural population above 40% he received 16% of the vote and in small districts with a rural popula-
tion above 30% he obtained 24% of the vote. 
The Ahmadinejad camp realises its unpopularity amongst these groups and  has tailored accord-
ingly its campaign strategy.  Ahmadinejad will focus less on populist economic promises, and project 
himself as the best candidate to defend Iran’s nuclear programme and national interests in the face 
of continued dangerous threats from external enemies whilst portraying his reformist opponents as 
weak in regard to the West and historically unable to defend the nuclear programme. In addition 
to this nationalist rhetoric he will portray himself as the true defender of Islamic Iranian culture and 
morality in the face of western cultural imperialism. At the same time, his camp  is trying to prevent 
the electoral mobilisation of the  the youth and urban voters. Facebook which had become an instru-
ment for the electoral mobilisation of the youth, has once again been filtered whilst the chiefs of 
police of several cities have announced that the Karrubi and Mussavi camps do not have the right 
to put up campaign posters except in limited designated areas.  These are signs of worry within the 
Ahmadinejad camp. Lastly, in order to discourage these two groups  from coming out in large num-
bers on ballot day, especially in the first round, the Ahmadinejad camp is propagating the belief that 
Ahmadinejad’s victory is all but assured. The ultimate goal of the Ahmadinejad camp is to obtain 
more than 50% of the vote in the first round. If it cannot get that 50% and the election goes to the 
second round, which seems more than likely, Ahmadinejad’s chances of achieving victory greatly 
decrease. In a second round, not only would the reformist and moderate vote be unified behind 
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either Karrubi or Mussavi, but also the chances increase that first-time and occasional voters, sensing 
that Ahmadinejad could lose, will vote. One major worry for the reformist and moderate camps is 
the possibility of vote-rigging by certain forces. After a period of political wrangling, the Guardians 
Council has given permission for representatives of all the candidates to supervise voting at all poll-
ing stations, but how effective this will be in preventing fraud remains to be seen. 
The common logic is that the vote of rural and small urban  areas will lead to an Ahmadinejad vic-
tory. This interpretation has two major faults. First, these groups do not constitute an electoral ma-
jority. If the youth and urban populations achieve a 65% participation rate, they will overcome the 
electoral influence of the  rural and small  urban areas. Second, Ahmadinejad’s popularity in these 
areas  is exaggerated by his camp. The economic malaise that has hit the country has hurt severely  
these areas. His populist rhetoric there is not as effective as it was four years ago. Lastly, the sup-
port of these areas which he obtained in the second round of the 2005 elections was the result of a 
context that does not exist today.
Predicting the outcome of presidential elections in post-Khatami Iran is difficult. One reason for this 
is Khatami’s politics which created the conditions for more competitive elections as different elite 
groups struggle over the future direction of the country and the Islamic Revolution, and of the in-
creasing divide between rural and urban, rich and poor, reformist and traditional. Despite a sluggish 
start, election fever is beginning to spread and there are signs that the urban and youth vote is mo-
bilising. That which can be said with a degree of confidence is that if the urban and youth popula-
tions, including first-time and occasional voters, have a participation vote above 65%, Ahmadinejad 
will lose his bid to be re-elected. In other words, if the majority votes, the minority will not be able 
to govern.
